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Abstract
This Article will illustrate that indeed, European environmental law is not just another sectoral
policy area of the European Union (“EU”). Over the years it has proven to have a major impact
on various general doctrines of European law. In that sense, European environmental law had
(and still has) an important spill-over impact upon general European Community (“EC”) law. It
is the modest ambit of this Article to illustrate some of the environmental spill-overs into general
European law, specifically examining the role of the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) and its
case law.
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INTRODUCTION1
In 1992, I asked myself the question: "What must be under-
stood about European environmental law and how does it relate
to European law in general? ' 2 In my inaugural address at the
University of Amsterdam, I took the view that a sectoral branch
of law like European environmental law can only be studied and
analyzed adequately by examining its interaction with general
European law doctrines. There are two possible approaches in
such an analysis. A top down approach would study the influ-
ence of general European law on European environmental law.
This raises questions such as "what are the consequences of the
notion of 'measures having equivalent effect' on the ability of
Member States to take environmental measures restricting the
free movement of goods" or "what are the consequences of con-
sidering 'waste' as a 'product' more or less like any other prod-
uct, subject to the rules of the internal market?" In contrast, a
bottom up approach would examine how developments in envi-
ronmental law have influenced general doctrines of European
law. It goes without saying that a complete analysis of all legal
aspects of European environmental law requires an examination
of both approaches. However, this Article will emphasize the
* Professor of Administrative Law, University of Groningen, Faculty of Law, Head
of Department of Administrative Law and Public Administration.
** The author acknowledges the fruitful inspiration for this Article from the arti-
cle on this theme by H.G. Sevenster & J.M.P. Janssen, Het Europees Milieurecht als Proef-
tuin, in HET MILIEURECHT ALS PROEF'UIN: 20JAAR CENTRUM VOOR MILIEURECHT 201-18
(M.V.C. Aalders & R. Uylenburg eds., 2007). Prof. Sevenster is professor of European
Environmental Law at the University of Amsterdam and member of the Dutch Raad van
State (Council of State). Mr. Janssen lectured European Environmental Law at the Cen-
tre for Environmental Law at the University of Amsterdam and is presently working as a
legal expert with Oranjewoud, a major Dutch environmental consultancy firm.
1. This Article expands the issues raised in J.H. JANs & H.H.B. VEDDER, EUROPEAN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAw (3d ed. 2008).
2. J.H.Jans, Inaugural Address at the University of Amsterdam (Dec. 22, 1992), in OVER
GRENZEN VAN MILIEURECHT (W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink ed., 1992).
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bottom up approach. This Article will illustrate that indeed, Eu-
ropean environmental law is not just another sectoral policy area
of the European Union ("EU"). Over the years it has proven to
have a major impact on various general doctrines of European
law. In that sense, European environmental law had (and still
has) an important spill-over impact upon general European
Community ("EC") law. For example, consider the subsidiarity
principle.' Today subsidiarity is the magic word for many politi-
cians in almost every EU Member State. Without the subsidiarity
principle it is difficult to see how those politicians could sell the
recent Reform Treaty4 to their voters. One tends to forget that
within the EU the origin of this principle can be found in Euro-
pean environmental law. Twenty years ago the Single European
Act introduced specific legal provisions on environmental policy
(Articles 130r, 130s and 130t EC). 5 Article 130r(4) stated: "The
Community shall take action relating to the environment to the
extent to which the objectives referred to in paragraph 1 can be
attained better at Community level than at the level of the indi-
vidual Member States."6 Paragraph 2 of Article 130r introduced
another "new" principle, the integration principle: "Environ-
mental protection requirements shall be a component of the
Community's other policies."7 At that time, it was one of the first
integration principles in the Treaty.' In contrast, nowadays, it is
different. There are, more or less similar, integration principles
3. The subsidiarity principle as articulated in EC Treaty Article 5, and supple-
mented by the Subsidiarity Protocol added by the Treaty of Amsterdam, is complex and
not without dispute concerning its meaning. Essentially, the subsidiarity principal per-
mits the community to take action, outside of fields within its exclusive competence,
when Member State action is insufficient, while community action would be more effi-
cacious. See generally George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiariy Seriously: Federalism in the
European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 332 (1994).
4. See generally Treaty of Lisbon (Reform Treaty), O.J. C 306/01 (2007), opened for
signature Dec. 13, 2007 (not yet ratified).
5. SeeJ.H. JANs, EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 1-64 (1995); see also J.H. Jans, The
Development of EC Environmental Law, in EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAw: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECrIVE 271-76 (G. Winter ed., 1996); Koen Lenaerts, The Principle of Subsidiarity and
the Environment in the European Union: Keeping the Balance of Federalism, 17 Fordham Int'l
L.J. 846 (1994); W.P.J. Wils, Subsidiarity and EC Environmental Policy: Taking People's Con-
cerns Seriously, 6J. Envfl. L. 85 (1994).
6. See Single European Act art. 130r(4), O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R.
741 [hereinafter SEA] (amending Treaty establishing the European Economic Commu-
nity, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
7. Id. art. 130r(2), O.J. L 169/1.
8. See J.H. Jans, Externe Integratie in Het Gemeenschapsrecht, in TIJDSCH-IRr VOOR MI-
LIEU EN RECHT 294-99 (1994).
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in areas such as regional policy,9 culture, 10 public health, l con-
sumer protection,' 2 industrial policy,13 and development cooper-
ation.1 4 Moreover, the Treaty of Amsterdam promoted integra-
tion to a general principle of EC law. 5
It is the modest ambit of this Article to illustrate some of the
environmental spill-overs into general European law, specifically
examining the role of the European Court ofJustice ("ECJ") and
its case law.16
I. LEGAL BASIS
The choice of the correct legal basis of EU environmental
measures has always been a hot potato. 7 Of course, since the
adoption of the Single European Act, the EC Treaty provides an
explicit legal base for environmental measures today.' 8 How-
ever, because most of the EU environmental measures have a
clear impact on the internal market, the question of which legal
ground to use had never faded away. The case law developed by
the European Court of Justice in environmental cases has been
widely exported by the ECJ to other areas of choices between
possible Treaty bases for adopting legislation.
We will first examine Article 95 EC as a legal basis for enact-
ing environmental measures. Article 95 provides that the Coun-
cil, acting in accordance with the co-decision procedure, shall
adopt the measures for the approximation of national legislation
"which have as their object the establishment and functioning of
9. See, e.g., Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Commu-
nity art. 159, O.J. C 321 E/37, at E/118 (2006) [hereinafter EC Treaty], as amended by
the Treaty of Nice, Mar. 10, 2001, OJ. C 80/1 (2001). See generally NELE DHONDT, INTE-
GRATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION INTO OTHER EC POLICIES: LEGAL THEORY AND
PRACTICE (2003).
10. See EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 151, O.J. C 321 E/37, at E/113.
11. See id. art. 152(1), at E/114.
12. See id. art. 153(2), at E/116.
13. See id. art. 157(3), at E/118.
14. See id. art. 178, at E/126.
15. But seeJ.H. Jans &J. Scott, The Convention on the Future of Europe: An Environmen-
tal Perspective, 15 J. ENVrL. L. 323, 325-27 (2003) (recounting the debate on environ-
mental integration as a "general principle" in drafting the proposed Constitutional
Treaty).
16. See generally Sir. Francis Jacobs, The Role of the European Court of Justice in the
Protection of the Environment, 18J. ENvrL. L. 185 (2006).
17. SeeJ.H. Jans, The Competences for EC Environmental Law, in EUROPEAN ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW supra note 5, at 317, 317-40.
18. See EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 175, O.J. C 321 E/37, at E/124.
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the internal market."19 It is clear that many measures which can
be characterized as environmental in character may also have a
significant impact on the establishment of the internal market.
This is recognized in the Treaty. According to Article 95 (3), the
Commission is to incorporate a high level of environmental pro-
tection in its proposals for legislative measures intended to
achieve the internal market. This indicates that, at any rate,
some environmental measures fall within the scope of Article 95.
The Court has held that whenever the conditions for recourse to
Article 95 as a legal basis are fulfilled, the European legislature
cannot be prevented from relying on that legal basis on the
ground that public health protection is a decisive factor in the
choices to be made. It is the author's opinion that this argu-
ment can be made to use Article 95 as a legal basis for protection
measures when they contribute to achieving the internal market.
Thus it can be said that the harmonization of the conditions
under which certain environmentally harmful products are
placed on the market is important for attaining the free move-
ment of goods, and hence using Article 95 to enact the harmoni-
zation rules. After all, as long as the environmental product
standard rules continue to differ in the various Member States,
there can be no question of the free movement of environmen-
tally hazardous goods. Harmonization of the conditions under
which such products are allowed to be placed on the market
and/or used will thus often fall within the scope of Article 95.
However, many other environmental measures may also relate to
the functioning of the internal market. In general, one could
say that any national rule concerning modes or conditions of
production has an effect on competition and may therefore be
properly subject to decision-making under Article 95 EC. This
has been acknowledged by the ECJ. In the Titanium Dioxide case
concerning the permissible limits of the emission of this danger-
ous chemical, the Court of Justice observed:
[A]ction intended to approximate national rules concerning
production conditions in a given industrial sector with the
aim of eliminating distortions of competition in that sector is
conducive to the attainment of the internal market and thus
falls within the scope of Article 100a, a provision which is par-
ticularly appropriate to the attainment of the internal mar-
19. Id. art. 95(1), at E/79.
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The Court held that the content of Directive 89/42821 on
the reduction of pollution caused by waste from the titanium
dioxide industry fell within the scope of Article 95. The directive
contains rules prohibiting or requiring the reduction of the dis-
charge of waste and lays down timetables for the implementation
of the various provisions. An unusual feature of this case was
that the directive applied to a specific industry. The Court re-
ferred to this in its judgment.22
The next question which accordingly arises is to what extent
environmental measures which have a more diffuse effect on the
competitive position of companies could be enacted only on the
legal basis of Article 95. In its judgment in the Waste Framework
Directive23 case concerning the validity of Directive 91/156 on
waste, the Court acknowledged that the obligation contained in
Article 4 of that directive-which requires Member States to take
the necessary measures to ensure that waste is recovered or dis-
posed of without endangering human health and without harm-
ing the environment-can have a certain harmonizing effect.
However, the Court nevertheless held that the mere fact that the
internal market is concerned to some degree was insufficient to
enable the use of Article 95 to adopt the directive. 24 Thus, if the
effect of attaining market integration is only incidental, an envi-
ronmental protection measure cannot be adopted solely on the
legal basis of Article 95.
It is reasonable to conclude that the scope of Article 95, in
principle, is more than sufficient to serve as a basis for measures
approximating national laws on environmental product stan-
dards and for environmental measures which regulate condi-
tions of production and remove distortions of competition in a
particular industry. In those cases it could be argued that the
primary objective of the measure is related to the establishment
20. Commission v. Council (Titanium Dioxide), Case C-300/89, [1991] E.C.R_ I-
2867, 23.
21. See Council Directive No. 89/428, O.J. L 201/56 (1989).
22. See generaUy Titanium Dioxide, [1991] E.C.R. 1-2867.
23. See Council Directive No. 91/156, OJ. L 78/32 (1991).
24. See Commission v. Council (Waste Framework Directive), Case C-155/91,
[1993] ECR 1-939; see also European Parliament v. Council, Case C-187/93, [1994] ECR
1-2857 (affirming the Court's approach in Waste Framework Directive in examining the
legal basis of Commission Regulation No. 259/93, OJ. L 30/1 (1993)).
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or functioning of the internal market. For more general envi-
ronmental measures, which have a more diffuse effect rather
than having a specific effect on the competitive position of com-
panies, it can be concluded from the case law that when the ef-
fects are of an incidental nature, the measure falls outside the
scope of Article 9525 and should therefore be based on Article
175 EC.
The case law focusing on the primary objective of a legisla-
tive measure is still very much alive. It is settled case law that the
choice of the legal basis for a European measure must be based
on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review and
include, in particular, the aim and content of the measure. 26 In
other words, the European legislature is not free to choose a le-
gal basis as it sees fit. With respect to the use of Article 175 or
Article 95 (or any other legal basis), it is important to look for
the "centre of gravity" of the measure. Or in the words of the
Court of Justice:
If examination of a Community measure reveals that it pur-
sues a twofold purpose or that it has a twofold component
and if one of those is identifiable as the main or predominant
purpose or component, whereas the other is merely inciden-
tal, the act must be based on a single legal basis, namely that
required by the main or predominant purpose or compo-
nent.2
7
The fact that a measure pursues an environmental objective
does not necessarily imply that Article 175 is the correct legal
basis.28 It is clear from the practice of the past few years that the
majority of recent environmental directives and regulations are
based either on Article 175 or Article 95. In exceptional circum-
25. See generally Waste Framework Directive, [1993] E.C.R. 1-939.
26. See, e.g., Commission v. Council, Case C-176/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-7879, 45
(deciding the appropriate legal basis of Framework Decision 2003/80); Portugal v.
Council, Case C-268/94, [1996] E.C.R. 1-6177, 22; Commission v. Council, Case C-
300/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-2867, 1 10; Commission v. Council, Case 45/86, [1987] E.C.R.
1-1493, 11.
27. Commission v. European Parliament & Council, Case C-178/03, [2006] E.C.R.
1-107, 42. But see ECJ Opinion 2/00, Cartagena Protocol, [2001] E.C.R. 1-9713 (dis-
cussing the "centre of gravity" doctrine).
28. See, e.g., Netherlands v. European Council & Parliament, Case C-377/98,
[2000] E.C.R. 1-6229 (concerning an application for annulment of European Parlia-
ment); see also Council Directive No. 98/44, OJ. L 213/13 (1998) (legal protection of
biotechnological inventions).
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stances, a legislative measure simultaneously pursues a number
of objectives or has several components that are linked, without
one being subordinate to the other. The Court held that such
an act had to be adopted by reference to both legal bases.29 The
Court has, however, emphasized that the legislative procedures
laid down for each legal basis must not be incompatible with
each other and use of the two legal bases must not undermine
the rights of the Parliament.3° Where different legislative deci-
sion-making procedures are combined, their modalities must
also be combined. In practice this means that the more de-
manding procedure must be adhered to as well as any additional
requirements set in the less demanding procedure.
The Court was faced with an interesting political issue in
2005.1 The question was to what extent, if any, Article 175 can
or even must be used as a legal basis to harmonize national crim-
inal law.3 2 Based on Title VI of the Treaty on European Union
("TEU"), (in particular Articles 29 TEU, 31(e) TEU and
34(2) (b) TEU) the Council adopted Framework Decision 2003/
80 on the protection of the environment through criminal law.3
In essence, this framework decision for a number of environ-
mental offenses required the Member States to introduce crimi-
nal penalties. The Commission challenged the Council's choice
of the Treaty on European Union's Title VI as the legal basis for
the framework decision.34 The Commission contended that the
decision could be adopted by use of Articles 174-176 EC, which
set out the scope of the Community's powers in the field of the
environment.3 5 The Court of Justice commenced by pointing to
Treaty on European Union Article 47, which provides that noth-
ing in the Treaty is to affect the EC Treaty and that "[i] t is the
task of the Court to ensure that acts which, according to the
Council, fall within the scope of Title VI of the [Treaty on Euro-
pean Union] do not encroach upon the powers conferred by the
29. See Commission v. European Parliament & Council, [2006] E.C.R. 1-107, 1 43.
30. See id. 57. See generally Commission v. Council, [1991] E.C.R. 1-2867.
31. See generally Commission v. Council, [2005] E.C.R. 1-7879.
32. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME IN EUROPE: RULES OF SANCTIONS (Fran4ois
Comte & Ludwig Kramer eds., 2004) (general discussion of European environmental
criminal law).
33. Commission Decision No. 2003/80/JHA, O.J. L 29/55 (2003).
34. See Commission v. Council, [2005] ECR 1-7879, 18.
35. Id.
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EC Treaty on the Community. '36 The Court acknowledged that
the framework decision did indeed "entail partial harmonisation
of the criminal laws of the Member States" and that "as a general
rule, neither criminal law nor the rules of criminal procedure
fall within the Community's competence."3 7 However, the Court
observed that this:
[D]oes not prevent the Community legislature, when the ap-
plication of effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal
penalties by the competent national authorities is an essential
measure for combating serious environmental offences, from
taking measures which relate to the criminal law of the Mem-
ber States which it considers necessary in order to ensure that
the rules which it lays down on environmental protection are
fully effective.3 8
The Court concluded that the framework decision had as its
main purpose the protection of the environment (and not har-
monizing criminal law as such) and therefore could have been
properly adopted on the basis of Article 175. 39
The Commission, in the aftermath of Case C-176/03, has
now proposed a Directive on the protection of the environment
through criminal law.4° The proposed directive establishes a
minimum set of serious environmental offenses that should be
considered criminal throughout the EU when committed inten-
tionally or with serious negligence.41 The scope of liability of
legal persons is defined in detail. For offenses committed under
certain aggravating circumstances the minimum level of maxi-
mum sanctions for natural and legal persons is likewise harmo-
nized.4 2 Note that this part of the proposal goes well beyond the
level of harmonization of the annulled Framework Decision in
Case C-1 76/03."3 In view of the ECJ judgment in Case -440/05,
to be discussed infra, it is questionable whether the Council and
European Parliament are competent to enact this proposal
under Article 175(1) alone.
36. Id. 39.
37. Id. 47.
38. Id. 48.
39. Id. 51.
40. See generally Proposal for Directive of European Parliament and Council on the
Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law, O.J. C 180E/238 (2001).
41. Id. arts. 6-7.
42. See generally Commission v. Council, Case C-176/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-7879.
43. See id.
13672008]
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The judgment in Case C-1 76/03 was confirmed in Case C-
440/05."4 In that case the Commission was seeking annulment
of Council Framework Decision 2005/667 to strengthen the
criminal-law framework for the enforcement of the law against
ship-source pollution.45 However, the Court made it in that case
perfectly clear that "the determination of the type and level of
the criminal penalties to be applied does not fall within the
Community's sphere of competence."46
In sum, whenever criminal penalties are essential for com-
bating serious offenses against the environment, Article 175 EC
provides for the correct legal basis to require Member States to
introduce such penalties, but it does not provide a legal basis to
determine the type and level of criminal penalties. This would
require legislative measures under the Third Pillar of the Treaty
on European Union. However, this debate on the use of correct
legal basis for harmonizing environmental criminal law will be-
come obsolete after the entry into force of the Reform Treaty.
In general, the "depillarization" undertaken by the Reform
Treaty will cause the "ordinary legislative procedure" to be appli-
cable for both European environmental law and European crim-
inal law.
II. DEROGATION UNDER ARTICLE 95(4)-(6)
Paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 95 read as follows:
If, after the adoption by the Council or by the Commission of
a harmonisation measure, a Member State deems it necessary
to maintain national provisions on grounds of major needs
referred to in Article 30, or relating to the protection of the
environment or the working environment, it shall notify the
Commission of these provisions as well as the grounds for
maintaining them. Moreover, without prejudice to paragraph
4, if, after the adoption by the Council or by the Commission
of a harmonisation measure, a Member State deems it neces-
sary to introduce national provisions based on new scientific
evidence relating to the protection of the environment or the
working environment on grounds of a problem specific to
that Member State arising after the adoption of the
44. Commission v. Council (Ship-source Pollution), Case C-440/05 (ECJ Oct. 23,
2007) (not yet reported).
45. Id.
46. Id. 70.
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harmonisation measure, it shall notify the Commission of the
envisaged provisions as well as the grounds for introducing
them.4 7
The Court of Justice has held that the procedure of Article 95
EC allows a Member State to maintain48 (paragraph 4) or to in-
troduce (paragraph 5) national rules derogating from a harmo-
nization measure taken in the framework of the internal mar-
ket.49 Article 95(4)-(5) provides an exception to the principles
of uniform application of European law and the unity of the
market and therefore must be strictly interpreted." It is for the
Member State that invokes Article 95 (4)-(5) EC to prove that the
conditions for application of those provisions have been met.5 1
As Sevenster & Janssen rightly noted, it is quite remarkable
that although the derogation procedure is applicable to all "Arti-
cle 95-measures," the case law related to this provision is more or
less exclusively environmental. 2 Let us have a look at some of
the more recent cases. 3
A. New National Legislation
Although a Member State's adoption of new measures dero-
gating from harmonization legislation is covered by Article 95 (5)
EC, the cumulative conditions under which this is permitted are
not altogether clear.5 4 First of all, paragraph 5 requires that
Member States must prove that there is "new scientific evidence"
justifying their measures.55 New evidence requires that the sci-
entific evidence on which the request is based was not available
47. See EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 95, O.J. C 321 E/37, at E/79.
48. In general, national provisions which exist only in draft form at the moment of
adoption of the measure will have to be examined under Article 95(5). For the excep-
tion to that rule, see Commission Decision No. 2002/884/EC, O.J. L 308/30 (2002).
49. See France v. Commission, Case C-41/93, [1994] E.C.R. 1-1829.
50. See EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 95, O.J. C 321 E/37, at E/79.
51. See Land Ober6sterreich & Austria v. Commission (Land Ober6sterreich),
Case T-366/03, [2005] E.C.R. 11-4005, 63; see also Netherlands v. Commission, Case T-
182/06, 50 (CFIJune 27, 2007) (not yet reported); Denmark v. Commission, Case C-
3/00, [2003] E.C.1, 1-2643, 1 84.
52. See H.G. Sevenster &J.M.P. Janssen, Het Europees Milieurecht al Proefluin, in HET
MILIEURECHT ALS PROEFrUIN: 20 JAAR CENTRUM VOOR MILIEURECHT 201, 208 (M.V.C.
Aalders & R. Uylenburg eds., 2007).
53. See, e.g., N. de Sadeleer, Procedures for Derogations From the Principle of Approxima-
tion of Laws Under Article 95 EC, 40 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 889, 889-915 (2003).
54. See e.g., Germany v. Commission, Case C-512/99, [2003] E.C.R. 1-845, 81.
55. See EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 95, O.J. C 321 E/37, at E/79.
2008] 1369
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at the time of adoption of the directive in question.56 However,
it is not quite clear whether "new" must be understood as evi-
dence produced and/or published after the adoption of the Eu-
ropean measure only, or that it also includes "older" evidence
that was not taken into account by the European institutions
during the decision-making procedure.
In a case concerning emissions of particulate matter by die-
sel powered vehicles, the Dutch Government produced recent
scientific studies to show that susceptible population groups are
subject to higher health risks associated with particulate mat-
ter.57 Although the Commission noted that the environmental
and health effects related to particulate matter concentrations
were already known to a certain extent before the adoption of
Directive 98/69, it did accept the studies as new evidence. Since
the adoption of the directive, a large number of new epidemio-
logical studies on many aspects of exposure and health effects of
particulate matter have been completed which led the World
Health Organization to produce updates of its air quality guide-
lines.
Watertight proof should not be necessary, as this clause
must be interpreted in the light of the precautionary principle. 8
However, a mere change in national policy views would not seem
sufficient to permit a state to derogate from a prior directive.59
Secondly, paragraph 5 requires that this evidence relate to the
protection of the environment or the working environment.
60
The public policy grounds of Article 30 EC are omitted. This
clearly restricts a Member State's options to derogate from Euro-
pean standards in the area of chemicals, dangerous substances,
biocides, etc. This may seem odd, particularly given that public
policy grounds can be used for maintaining existing national
standards. Introducing new national standards is therefore
more difficult than maintaining existing ones. The reason for
this has been explained by the Court in the German Man-made
Mineral Fibres case:
The difference between the two cases provided for in Article
56. See Denmark, [2003] E.C.R. 1-2643, 57.
57. See Commission Decision No. 2006/372, O.J. L 142/16 (2006).
58. See Commission Decision No. 1999/832, O.J. L 329/25, 9 104 (1999).
59. The precautionary principle does not imply that either. See Denmark, [2003]
E.C.R. 1-2643, 103.
60. See EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 95, O.J. C 321 E/37, at E/79.
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95 EC is that, in the first, the national provisions predated the
harmonisation measure. They were therefore known to the
Community legislature but it could not or did not seek to be
guided by them for the purpose of harmonisation. It was
therefore considered acceptable for the Member State to re-
quest that its own rules remain in force. To that end, the EC
Treaty requires that such national provisions must be justified
on grounds of the major needs referred to in Article 30 EC or
relating to the protection of the environment or the working
environment. By contrast, in the second case, the adoption
of new national legislation is more likely to jeopardise
harmonisation. The Community institutions could not, by
definition, have taken account of the national text when
drawing up the harmonisation measure. In that case, the re-
quirements referred to in Article 30 EC are not taken into
account and only grounds relating to protection of the envi-
ronment or the working environment are accepted, on condi-
tion that the Member State provides new scientific evidence
and that the need to introduce new national provisions re-
sults from a problem specific to the Member State concerned
arising after the adoption of the harmonisation measure. 61
This line of reasoning is not entirely convincing. This imbalance
in the Treaty, sanctioned by the Court, could result in a national
measure being allowed in one Member State (as existing na-
tional legislation covered by an Article 30 EC) but not in another
(because it was being introduced there).
B. A Problem Specific to That Member State and Article 95(5)
Under Article 95(5) EC, the Member State must show that
the new national measures are necessary to tackle a problem that
is specific to that Member State, for instance, because of its high
population density, highly concentrated infrastructure, special
geological, metrological or geomorphological circumstances,
etc. In other words, there have to be circumstances specific to
that Member State which can justify the more stringent environ-
mental measures. This means that simply "wanting stricter envi-
ronmental legislation" would not be sufficient. The Land Oberds-
terreich case made this quite clear.6 2
61. Germany v. Commission, Case C-512/99, [2003] E.C.R. 1-845, 41.
62. See Land Ober6sterreich, Case T-366/03, [2005] E.C.R. 11-4005, judgment upheld
by Joined Cases C-439 & C-454/05 P, [2007] E.C.R. _, [2007] 3 C.M.L.R. 52.
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The case concerned a notification under Article 95(5) EC
of a draft law of Land Ober6sterreich (Province of Upper Aus-
tria) banning genetic engineering altogether.63 The decision of
the Commission rejecting Austria's request for derogation was
challenged at the Court of First Instance ("CFI") under Article
230 EC. The Court upheld the Commission's decision in view of
Austria's failure to establish that the territory of Land Ober6ster-
reich contained "unusual or unique ecosystems that required
separate risk assessments from those conducted for Austria as a
whole or in other similar areas of Europe."64 Consequently, the
Court held that the arguments by which the applicants have dis-
puted the findings made by the Commission on the condition
relating to the existence of a problem specific to the notifying
Member State had to be rejected.6"
In the Dutch Diesel Engine case, the CFI further clarified this
requirement. 66 It argued that it is not possible to rely on Article
95(3) in order to deal with a general environmental danger in
the Community:
Any problem which arises in terms which are on the whole
comparable throughout the Member States and which lends
itself, therefore, to harmonised solutions at Community level
is general in nature and is, consequently, not specific within
the meaning of Article 95(5) EC. It is therefore necessary, in
order correctly to interpret Article 95(5) EC, to envisage the
requirement of national specificity of a problem essentially
from the angle of the aptness or inaptness of the harmonisa-
tion of the applicable Community rules to confront ade-
quately the difficulties encountered locally, since the estab-
lished inaptness of those rules justifies the introduction of na-
tional measures.6 7
In other words, justification for a Member State's derogation
must be based upon the fact that, due to the local nature of the
problem, a solution at the European level is not suitable to re-
solve the problem established.
However, this requirement does not necessarily mean that a
63. Id. 6.
64. Id. 767.
65. Id. 771.
66. See Netherlands v. Commission, Case T-182/06, 50 (CFIJune 27, 2007) (not
yet reported).
67. Id. 62-64.
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Member State would be precluded from taking more stringent
measures simply because the same problem also occurred else-
where also. In the Dutch Diesel Engine case, the Dutch Govern-
ment complained that the Commission had made the grant of
the derogation requested subject to the requirement that a spe-
cific air quality problem relied upon in support of its request
affects the Netherlands exclusively. After stating, as a matter of
principle, "for a problem to be specific to a Member State within
the meaning of the relevant provision, it is not necessary that it is
the result of an environmental danger within that State alone,"
the CFI found that the Commission did not in fact apply such an
exclusivity test and rejected the Netherlands government's claim
as lacking any factual basis.6" Indeed, specific does not mean
exclusive.
III. LEGAL PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
A. Articles 226-228 Infringements
The mere transposition of directives into national law is, of
course, not enough. The obligations they contain have to first
be applied and then enforced. This is primarily, but certainly
not exclusively, a responsibility of the Member States. In the ab-
sence of concrete and specific provisions, the Member States
must determine how the factual situation must be brought in
line with the legally desired situation. The manner in which Eu-
ropean law is enforced by the Member States is, however, under
Commission control. Inadequate enforcement, either in law or
in fact, may be a reason for the Commission to initiate proceed-
ings under Article 226 EC (future Article 258 TFEU).69 In this
respect an interesting development should be noted.
According to the judgment of the European Court ofJustice
in Commission v. Ireland, Case C-494/01, on twelve alleged in-
fringements, in fact, of the Waste Framework Directive, the
Court ruled that:
[I]n principle nothing prevents the Commission from seek-
ing in parallel a finding that provisions of a directive have not
68. Id. 65, 72.
69. See Commission v. Ireland, Case C-317/02, slip op. (ECJ Nov. 18, 2004), cited in
O.J. C 6/7 (2005). The Court ruled that Member States are required to ensure that the
appropriate measures are taken, including administrative action or criminal proceed-
ings, against those persons who have failed to comply with European rules.
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been complied with by reason of the conduct of a Member
State's authorities with regard to particular specifically identi-
fied situations and a finding that those provisions have not
been complied with because its authorities have adopted a
general practice contrary thereto, which the particular situa-
tions illustrate where appropriate.70
In other words, the Commission is entitled to deduct that there
is a general practice of non-compliance and non-enforcement
based on a series of individual infringements. This implies that
the Commission is not only entitled to demand that these indi-
vidual infringements of the directive are remedied, but also that
the public authorities in question change, more fundamentally
and structurally, their enforcement policies.7 1 To qualify as a
general practice of non-compliance the State conduct must be,
to some degree, of a consistent and general nature and must not
be geographically confined to only a part of the territory of the
Member State in question.7 2 This is yet another environmental
case with important spill-over effects upon the enforcement of
European law in general.
B. Imposing Financial Sanctions on a Member State
Since the Treaty of Maastricht introduced Article 228 into
the EC Treaty, the Court has been able to impose a lump sum
and/or penalty payment 73 on a Member State that has failed to
implement a judgment establishing an infringement.74 Al-
though the decision on the imposition of the sanctions lies with
the Court of Justice, which has full jurisdiction in this area, the
70. See Commission v. Ireland, Case C-494/01, [2005] E.C.R. 1-3331, 27; see also
P I Wennerf.s, A New Dawn for Commission Under Directive Articles 226 and 228 EC: General
and Persistent (GAP) Infringements, Lump Sums and Penalty Payments, COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 31, 31-62 (2006).
71. See PAL WENNERAS, THE ENFORCEMENT OF EC ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 252-61
(2007).
72. See Commission v. Germany, Case C-441/02, [2006] E.C.R. 1-3449, 50; see also
Commission v. Ireland, Case C-248/05 (ECJ Oct. 25, 2007) (not yet reported) (describ-
ing the criterium of "geographically confined").
73. The judgment in Commission v. France, Case C-304/02, [2005] E.C.R 1-6263,
confirmed that the two kinds of financial sanctions (penalty and lump sum) can apply
cumulatively for the same infringement. According, the Commission favors combined
sanctions, although the Commission does not exclude the possibility, in very specific
cases, of recourse to the lump sum alone. See Commission Communication-Applica-
tion of Article 228 of the EC Treaty, SEC (2005) 1658, at 3.
74. Id. at 1.
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Commission plays a decisive initial role in so far as it is responsi-
ble for initiating the Article 228 procedure and bringing the case
before the Court of Justice with a proposal for the application of
a lump sum and/or penalty payment of a specific amount.75 In
1996, the Commission published guidelines on how to apply fi-
nancial sanctions under Article 228.76 According to the Com-
mission the fixing of sanctions should be based on three funda-
mental criteria:
" the seriousness of the infringement;
* its duration;
* the need to ensure that the penalty itself is a deterrent to
further infringements.
77
From the point of view of the effectiveness of the sanction, the
Commission regards that it is important to fix sanction amounts
that are appropriate to ensure their effectiveness. The Commis-
sion's first use of a proposal of Article 228 penalties came in en-
vironment-related cases.
78
In Case C-387/97, the Commission requested that Greece be
ordered to pay a penalty as long as it fails to take necessary mea-
sures to ensure that toxic waste in an area in Crete is disposed of
without endangering human health and without harming the
environment. 79 The Court had already found in 1992 that
Greece had failed to prevent environmental pollution." The
Court agreed with the Commission and ordered Greece to pay a
penalty of C20,000 per day as long as it failed to take the neces-
sary measures.8 ' The Court emphasized that the failure to com-
ply with the obligations resulting from the Framework Waste Di-
rective could, by the very nature of that obligation, endanger
human health directly and harm the environment and therefore
had to be regarded as particularly serious.8 2
Case C-278/01 concerned the failure of Spain to comply with
75. This proposal "cannot bind the Court and merely constitute a useful point of
reference." Commission v. Spain, Case C-278/01, [2003] E.C.R. 1-14141, 1 41.
76. See generally Commission Communication, supra note 73, SEC (2005) 1658.
77. Id. at 6.
78, See, e.g., Commission v. Greece, Case C-387/97, [2000] E.C.R. 1-5047; see also
Spain, [2003] E.C.R. 1-14141.
79. See Greece, [2000] E.C.R. 1-5047, 1 99.
80. See Commission v. Greece, Case C-45/91, [1992] E.C.R. 1-2509.
81. See Greece, [2000] E.C.R. 1-5047, 1 99.
82. See id. 1 94.
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the minimum water standards in the Bathing Water Directive.83
The Court ordered Spain to pay to the Commission a penalty
payment of C624,150 per year per one percent of area suitable
for swimming in Spanish inshore waters which did not conform
to the minimum standards laid down under the directive for the
year in question. The penalties would commence from the time
when the quality of bathing water in the first bathing season fol-
lowing delivery of the judgment was determined and run until
the year in which Spain fully complied with the judgment.8 4
In both cases the Court affirmed the importance of the pro-
portionality principle, stating that a penalty payment should be
appropriate to the circumstances and proportionate both to the
breach found and to the ability of the Member State concerned
to pay the penalty. According to the Court in Case C-278/01,
there may be infringement situations, for instance concerning
quality standards for bathing water set by the directive, where, as
the Court noted, "it is particularly difficult for the Member
States to achieve complete implementation," and where "it is
conceivable that the defendant Member State might manage sig-
nificantly to increase the extent of its implementation of the Di-
rective but not to implement it fully in the short term."85 In
those circumstances, the Court ruled, "a penalty which does not
take account of the progress which a Member State may have
made in complying with its obligations is neither appropriate to
the circumstances nor proportionate to the breach which has
been found."86
The Commission acknowledged that the suspension of a
penalty might sometimes be justifiable. For instance, a Member
State which is held to have permitted an important nature site to
deteriorate as a result of land drainage, and then subsequently
undertakes infrastructure works aimed at restoring the hydrolog-
ical conditions that are ecologically necessary. The Commission
may have to undertake monitoring in order to determine
whether the works have succeeded in remedying the harm
done.87
In fixing the amount of the penalty, the Commission con-
83. See Spain, [20031 E.C.R. 1-14141.
84. See id. 62.
85. See id. 47-48.
86. Id. 49.
87. See Commission Communication, supra note 73, SEC (2005) 1658, at 5.
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siders the importance of the European rules breached and the
impact of the infringement on general and particular interests.
"[S]erious or irreparable damage to human health or the envi-
ronment" is explicitly mentioned by the Commission as such a
factor.88
C. Revitalizing the VNO-Doctrine
Traditional Court doctrines hold that provisions of Euro-
pean law can only be directly effective (and thus relied upon
before national courts) if they satisfy the test of "unconditional
and sufficiently precise" measures. 89 This criterion meant that
when a State has discretionary powers in the implementation of
a provision of EC law, this will prevent it from having direct ef-
fect. Examples are provisions allowing a certain degree of free-
dom of choice or ones that leave the exercise of powers to the
discretion of the public authorities. Indeed, regulatory discre-
tion precludes a European rule from having direct effect. The
Court of Justice made only one exception in a rather obscure
Dutch tax law case which seemed to take a more loose view on
the matter.90 However, as the Court never followed precedent of
that case, one assumed that it was "dead." However, two recent
environmental cases have revitalized this doctrine. In the
Kraaijeveld v. Van Zuid-Holland case, the court had to consider
the question to what extent certain infrastructure works involv-
ing dykes should be subject to a prior environmental impact as-
sessment under the Environmental Impact Directive.9
Article 2(1) of the Directive lays down the general obliga-
tion that "projects likely to have significant effects on the envi-
ronment" are to be subject to an assessment.9 2 This general obli-
gation is further specified in Article 4(1) in combination with
Annex I of the Directive, which states the projects for which an
assessment is always required.93 There is no question of any dis-
cretion here. However, Article 4(2) in combination with Annex
88. Id. at 7.
89. See generally J.H. JANS ET AL., EUROPEANISATION OF PUBLIC LAw (2007); S.
PREcHAL, DIRECTIVES IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (2005).
90. See generally Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen v. Inspecteur der In-
voerrechten en Accijnzen, Case 51/76, [1977] E.C.R. 1-113.
91. See Kraaijeveld v. Van Zuid-Holland, Case C-72/95, [1996] E.C.R. 1-5403.
92. Id. 7.
93. See id. 46.
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II clearly gives the national legislature more freedom when im-
plementing the Directive. So much so that the Dutch Raad van
State (Council of State) denied that the directive could have di-
rect effect.94 This was because it allows the national legislature
to establish the criteria and/or thresholds necessary to deter-
mine whether or not a project is to be subject to an assessment.9"
In the Netherlands, works involving dykes (among the projects
listed in Annex II), were subject to an assessment if the dyke was
five kilometers or more in length, with a cross-section of at least
250 square meters.96 The Court of Justice concluded that Article
4(2) did allow Member States "a certain discretion," namely to
fix specifications, thresholds and criteria.97 However, it went on
to say that this discretion was itself limited, namely by the obliga-
tion set out in Article 2(1) that projects likely to have significant
effects on the environment are to be subject to an impact assess-
ment.98 The national court was instructed to examine whether
the legislature had remained within the limits of its discretion,
and thus to review the national legislation in the light of the di-
rective.99
In Landelijke Vereniging tot Behoud van de Waddenzee ("Wad-
denzee"), 100 the Court extended this approach. Where the na-
tional court was required in Kraaijeveld to examine whether the
national legislature had remained within the limits of discretion
allowed by the directive, in this case it became clear that even
where there is no implementing legislation, the decisions of an
administrative authority must also remain within those limits, and
that the national courts must examine whether or not this is the
case. This case concerned Article 6 of the Habitats Directive. 10'
Thus, the Court in fact acknowledged in Kraaijeveld and
Waddenzee that individuals may also rely on directive provisions
that allow Member States some discretion in their application
94. See Dutch Raad van State, 3 August 1993 [1994] AB 287; see also JANs ET AL.,
supra note 89, at 70.
95. See generally Kraaijeveld, [1997] E.C.R. 1-5403.
96. See id. 1.
97. See id. 3.
98. See id.
99. See id. 4.
100. Landelijke Vereniging tot Behoud van de Waddenzee v. Staatssecretaris van
Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij (Waddenzee), Case C-127/02, [2004] E.C.R. I-
7405, 65.
101. See generally id.
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(in this case the freedom to make exceptions in certain cases).
The national court must then examine whether the national legis-
lature has stayed within the limits of the law when exercising its
powers.
D. Inverse Direct Effect
A well known doctrine of the Court is that directives do not
produce horizontal or third-party effect in the sense that, in the
absence of national implementing measures, they directly result
in obligations for private individuals. 102 Under Article 249(3)
EC, directives are addressed to Member States and hence oblige
the Member States to take the necessary steps. They therefore
only have vertical direct effect. In principle, therefore, direct ef-
fect cannot be invoked to establish a breach of a provision of a
directive in relations between individuals. Apart from lacking
horizontal effect, a directive a fortiori also lacks "inverse direct
effect."1 °3 The notion of "inverse direct effect" was introduced
by the Court in the environmental case of Wells v. Secretary of State
for Transport, Local Government and the Regions.1 04 In Wells, how-
ever, the Court accepted that all kinds of indirect effects on the
legal position of individuals could not be equated to "inverse di-
rect effect," and thus limited the consequences of its "no-hori-
zontal-effect-of-directives" doctrine to a considerable degree.10
5
An environmental directive can give rise to obligations in a
more indirect way. If the competent authorities grant a permit
which is in conflict with a directive, an appeal by an interested
third party will result in its annulment. Acts which were allowed
by the permit before are no longer allowed once it has been an-
nulled. This has obvious consequences in the sphere of civil lia-
bility. In this roundabout way, horizontal effects on third parties
may arise after all.
There are other ways in which environmental directives can
produce indirect horizontal effects. Thus, where an interested
third party invokes a directly effective provision of an environ-
102. See Marshall v. Southampton & South-West Hamshire Area Health Auth.,
Case 152/84, [1986] E.C.R. 1-737, 48.
103. See Pretore di Sal6 v. Persons Unknown, Case 14/86, [1987] E.C.R. 1-2545,
19.
104. See Wells v. Sec'y of State for Transp., Local Gov't & the Regions, Case C-201/
02, [2004] E.C.R. 1-723, 1 58.
105. See generally Jans, supra note 2.
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mental directive, for example in an appeal against the grant of
an environmental permit, a successful appeal would mean that
the permit-holder would be placed in a less favorable position,
because his permit would be void. There is nothing surprising
about this, because a permit which contravenes national environ-
mental law can be annulled. The Court of Justice addressed this
problem in the Wells case. °6
This case concerned a dispute between Mrs. Wells and the
Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Re-
gions concerning the grant of a new consent for mining opera-
tions at Conygar Quarry without an environmental impact assess-
ment having first been carried out.10 7 In 1947 an "old mining
permission" had been granted for Conygar Quarry under the
Town and Country Planning Order 1946.108 Conygar Quarry
was divided into two sections, of slightly more than seven and
one half hectares each, separated by a road on which Mrs. Wells'
house was situated.1°9 Mrs. Wells had bought her house in 1984,
that is to say thirty-seven years after the mining permit had been
granted, but at a time when exploration of the Quarry had long
been dormant.110 The site was recognized to be environmentally
extremely sensitive. The area in or adjacent to which the quarry
lay was subject to several designations of nature and environ-
mental conservation importance. At the beginning of 1991, the
owners of Conygar Quarry applied to the competent Mineral
Planning Authority ("MPA") for registration of the old mining
permission under the Planning and Compensation Act 1991.11'
Registration was granted by a decision of August 24, 1992, which
stated that no development could lawfully be carried out unless
and until an application for the determination of new planning
conditions had been made to the MPA and finally decided (the
registration decision).112 The owners of Conygar Quarry had
therefore applied to the competent MPA for the determination
of new planning conditions. As the MPA, by decision of Decem-
106. See generally Waddenzee, Case C-127/02, [2004] E.C.R. 1-7405; Wells, [2004]
E.C.R. 1-723.
107. See Wells, [2004] E.C.R. 1-723, 1 2.
108. See id. It 8-9.
109. See id. 21.
110. See id.
111. See id. 23.
112. See id. 24.
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ber 22, 1994, had imposed more stringent conditions than those
requested by the owners of Conygar Quarry, the latter exercised
their right of appeal to the Secretary of State. By decision of
June 25, 1997, the Secretary of State imposed fifty-four planning
conditions, leaving some matters to be decided by the compe-
tent MPA."' Those matters were approved by the competent
MPA by decision of July 8, 1999.114 Neither the Secretary of
State nor the competent MPA had examined whether it was nec-
essary to carry out an environmental impact assessment pursuant
to Directive 85/337.
According to the United Kingdom government, acceptance
that an individual was entitled to invoke Directive 85/337 would
amount to inverse direct effect. The Court of Justice rejected
this: "[M] ere adverse repercussions on the rights of third parties,
even if the repercussions are certain, do notjustify preventing an
individual from invoking the provisions of a directive against the
Member State concerned.""' These adverse repercussions, the
Court stated in paragraph 58, were "not directly linked" to the
performance of any obligation which would fall on the quarry
owners under the directive1 16 They were "the consequence of
the belated performance of [the Member State's] obliga-
tions."' 17
This case demonstrates that, where a third party successfully
invokes the direct effect of the directive, this may put the permit
holder at a disadvantage. However, it is impossible to regard this
as an unacceptable form of horizontal effect: "mere adverse
repercussions on the rights of third parties" do not constitute
inverse direct effect. The effects for the permit holder have to
be seen as flowing from the rights which the third party has ob-
tained under the directive vis-d-vis the competent authorities and
are not "directly linked" 1 ' with obligations of the permit holder.
The adverse consequences of direct effect for the permit holder
do not stem from the directive, but from the fact that the author-
ities have failed to fulfil their obligations under it. If the directive
had been correctly implemented, the authorities would not have
113. See id. 27.
114. See id. 28.
115. See id. 57.
116. See id. 58.
117. See id.
118. See id. 56.
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granted the authorization in the first place. In so far as the addi-
tional burden results from the authorities' failure to fulfil their
obligations under the directive vis-A-vis other individuals, this
cannot be regarded as horizontal effect. However, whenever the
obligations of the authorities are directly linked with obligations of
individuals stemming from the (non-implemented) directive,
this would amount to inverse direct effect. Note that the Court's
new doctrine based on this judgment is not limited to environ-
mental issues, but may have general application in any area of
public law where national public authorities have to deal with
different rights and interests of the public concerned.
IV. FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS
In order to guarantee unobstructed movement of goods be-
tween the Member States, Article 28 EC prohibits national au-
thorities from imposing quantitative import restrictions on the
import of goods from other Member States, and all measures
having equivalent effect.' 1 9 Article 29 EC contains a similar pro-
hibition with respect to exports. 120 Article 30 EC lists a number
of exceptions to these two prohibitions.12 1 In addition, the
Court of Justice has formulated a number of supplementary
grounds justifying barriers to imports of goods ("rule of reason"
or Cassis de Dijon exceptions). In the Cassis de Dijon judgment
and in subsequent cases, it was decided that, in the absence of
harmonized rules, obstacles to free movement within the EU re-
sulting from disparities between the national laws must be ac-
cepted, in so far as such rules, applicable to domestic and im-
ported products without distinction, may be deemed to be neces-
sary in order to satisfy national mandatory requirements which
are accepted by the Court.1 2
2
As far as the rule of reason is concerned, the national mea-
sure in question must be applied without distinction to domestic
and foreign products. It was well-established case law that the
rule of reason doctrine cannot be relied on to justify national
measures which are not applicable to domestic products and im-
119. See EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 51, O.J. C 321 E/37, at E/62.
120. See id. art. 29, at E/53.
121. See id. art. 30, at E/53.
122. See Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein, Case 120/
78, [1979] E.C.R. 1-649.
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ported products without distinction, which usually means they
discriminate against imported products. 123 This meant that na-
tional protective measures which might be justified on environ-
mental grounds, but do not fall within the more limited scope of
the treaty based exceptions to free movement of goods set out in
Article 30 EC, are only allowed if they can be regarded as mea-
sures applicable without distinction.
However, the judgment in the Walloon Waste case was the
first case which caused some confusion as to the degree to which
a measure must be applicable without distinction for the rule of
reason to apply.124
In that case, the lawfulness of a Walloon prohibition on the
disposal of foreign waste was at issue. The Commission argued
that these mandatory requirements of environmental protection
could not be relied on to allow the Walloon restrictions.1 25 The
Commission insisted that the measures at issue discriminated
against waste coming from other Member States though that
waste was no more harmful than that produced in Wallonia. 126
The same line of reasoning was developed by Advocate General
Jacobs in his Opinion. In the Advocate General's view, there was
"plainly" discrimination between foreign and Belgian waste and
therefore the ruling of the Court in the Danish Bottles case could
not serve as a precedent. 12' The Court of Justice first confirmed
that the mandatory requirements are to be taken into account
only with regard to measures which apply to national and im-
ported products without distinction. 12' However, in order to de-
termine whether the obstacle in question is discriminatory, the
particular type of waste must be taken into account. The princi-
ple that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified
at source-a principle laid down by Article 174(2) EC for action
relating to the environment-means that it is for each region,
commune or other local entity to take appropriate measures to
receive, process and dispose of its own waste. Consequently,
123. See e.g., Aragonesa de Publicidad Exterior SA & Publivia SAE v. Departamento
de Sanidad y Seguridad Social de la Generalitat de Cataluna, Joined Cases C-1/90 & C-
176/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-4151, 13.
124. See Commission v. Belgium (Walloon Waste), Case C-2/90, [1992] E.C.R. I-
4431.
125. See id. 33.
126. See id.
127. Id.; see also Commission v. Denmark, Case 302/86, [1988] E.C.R. 1-4607.
128. See Walloon Waste, [1992] E.C.R. 1-4431, 1 34.
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waste should be disposed of as close as possible to the place
where it is produced.129 The Court then observed that this prin-
ciple is in conformity with the principles of self-sufficiency and
proximity set out in the Basel Convention. The Court therefore
concluded that, having regard to the differences between waste
produced in one place and that in another and its connection
with the place where it is produced, the Belgian measures could
not be considered to be discriminatory."'
What is interesting is, in the first place, that the Court has
de facto equated the fact that a measure applies without distinc-
tion to the absence of discrimination. By thus equating the two,
the Court has made the test of whether or not a measure applies
without distinction a test of whether or not it is discriminatory.
The relevance of this discussion could be that, for a national
measure to benefit from the rule of reason exception, it no
longer has to be framed as a measure applicable without distinc-
tion. Apparently, differential measures can also be excepted us-
ing the rule of reason, as long as there is an objective justifica-
tion. More recent case law indeed seems to suggest that the cri-
terion "measure applicable without distinction" is no longer a
hard and fast rule in the case law of the Court of Justice.
For example, it could be argued that the German noise pol-
lution rules in Aher-Waggon GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland
do indeed adversely affect foreign aircraft in particular, and that
the Danish bee regulations protecting rare local bees from con-
tamination by foreign bee imports in Bluhme are essentially dis-
tinctly applicable measures."' PreussenElektra AG v. Schhleswag
AG represents the best example of an environmental case where
the Court applied a rule of reason test, albeit not explicitly, with
respect to a distinctly applicable measure.13 2 The German rules
clearly favored domestic "green energy" producing undertakings
and it is hard to see those rules as being indistinctly applicable.
It is the author's opinion that the Court in that case applied the
rule of reason and not Article 30 EC. The judgment indicates,
129. See id.
130. See id. 35.
131. See Aher-Waggon GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Case C-389/96,
[1998] E.C.R. 1-4473, 2; see also In re Bluhme, Case C-67/97, [1998] E.C.R. 1-8033,
16.
132. See generally PreussenElektra AG v. Schhleswag AG, Case C-379/98, [2001]
E.C.R. 1-2099.
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where the Court ruled that the German measures "are not in-
compatible" with Article 28 EC, that the Court is not applying
the exception of Article 30 EC. 3 In that case the dictum of the
judgment would entail something like ".... is justified by Article
30 EC" or "Article 30 EC does not preclude ......
Finally, we should mention Case C-320/03, which involved
regional Austrian legislation prohibiting trucks weighing more
than seven and one half tons, carrying certain goods, from being
driven on a section of the A12 motorway in the Inn Valley.13 1
This legislation had clearly discriminatory elements as the prohi-
bition affected the international transit of goods, when non-Aus-
trian undertakings constituted over eighty percent of the truck
industry concerned. 35 Nevertheless, the Court ruled-subject
to the proportionality principle-that the Austrian legislation
had been adopted in order to ensure the quality of ambient air
and could be justified on "environmental protection
grounds."'1 6
Taken together with indications in the Court's case law
outside the field of the environment that the rule of reason will
be applied where measures do make a distinction between do-
mestic and imported products,3 7 it cannot be ruled out that the
relevance of the distinction between Article 30 interests and rule
of reason exceptions has ceased to exist. Perhaps it is time that
the Court should rule on this explicitly.'13
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article is to show that many important
developments on central issues of European law have their ori-
gins in the Court of Justice's case law concerning environmental
protections.
133. See id. 2.
134. See generally Commission v. Austria, Case C-320/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-9871.
135. See id. 38, 95.
136. See id. 71.
137. See Miller-Faurd v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzeker-
ingen UA & van Riet v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO Zorgverzekeringen,
Case C-385/99, [2003] E.C.R. 1-4509; see also Belgium v. Spain, Case C-388/95, [2000]
E.C.R. 1-3123; De Agostini Case, C-34/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-3843.
138. The Court has been invited to do so by Advocate General Jacobs in Preus-
senElektra. See PreussenElektra AG v. Schhleswag AG, Case C-379/98, [2001] E.C.R. I-
2099, 229; see also Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, Commission v. Austria,
Case C-320/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-9871, 106.
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The choice of the correct legal basis for EU measures has
been largely developed by environmental cases, such as the case
concerning the Titanium Dioxide Directive, the Waste Frame-
work Directive, Framework Decision 2003/80 on the protection
of the environment through criminal law and the Framework Di-
rective on Ship-source Pollution.
With respect to the question whether and to what extent
Member States are allowed to derogate from EU internal market
legislation, once again, the importance of environmental cases is
quite visible, as we have seen in the German Man-made Mineral
Fibres case and the Land Oberdsterreich case in particular.
On enforcement, Commission v. Ireland has effectively
handed the European Commission a very useful tool to tackle
enforcement issues in the Member States. Also, environmental
cases in particular have provided the initial basis for the applica-
tion of Article 228 enforcement penalties.
With respect to legal protection before the national courts
of the Member States, we must not underestimate the impor-
tance of the Kraaijeveld and Waddenzee case law, revitalizing the
VNO-Doctrine, thus enabling citizens to rely on European law,
even if the harmonization permits States administrative discre-
tion. The Wells case is important in this respect, as it limits, as far
as possible, the consequences of the "no-horizontal-effect-of-di-
rectives" doctrine.
Finally, we have discussed environmental protection mea-
sures as limits upon free movement of goods. The Walloon Waste
case can be seen as the source for the view that the relevance of
the distinction between Article 30 interests and rule of reason
exceptions has largely ceased to exist, as well as with respect to
the application of the rule of reason, the criterion of a "measure
applicable without distinction" is no longer a hard and fast rule
in the case law of the Court of Justice. Not in environmental
cases, not in other cases as well.
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